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In 2002, Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed
the first comprehensive changes to federal campaign finance law since
1974.' The new law, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), better known as McCain-Feingold, included a provision to
deal with the so-called Millionaire Loophole, which allows wealthy
candidates to spend unlimited personal funds on their own campaigns,
without regard for contribution restrictions or voluntary spending lim-
its.'
BCRA's "Millionaire Provision" represents a new attempt to
solve an old dilemma. Over thirty years ago, the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)3 attempted to address the same prob-
lem: candidates willing to spend their own money liberally to ensure
victory. FECA prohibited candidates from spending personal funds in
excess of statutory limits.' This prohibition, however, did not survive
the Supreme Court's seminal campaign finance decision, Buckley v
Valeo,' which held that restrictions on campaign spending violated the
First Amendment.6
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley governs all aspects of
federal elections, including a self-funded candidate's right to spend her
own funds in pursuit of federal office. By invalidating limits on self-
funding while generally upholding contribution limits, Buckley created
t B.A. 1995, Emory University; J.D. Candidate 2004, The University of Chicago.
1 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-155,116 Stat 81, to be codi-
fied at 2 USC § 431 et seq. See also Elisabeth Bumiller and Philip Shenon, President Signs Bill on
Campaign Gifts: Begins Money Tour, NY Times Al (Mar 28,2002).
2 See BCRA § 304 (providing for increased contribution limits and relaxed party spend-
ing restrictions for the opponents of self-funded candidates).
3 Pub L No 92-255, 86 Stat 3, codified as amended at 2 USC §§ 431-56 (2000).
4 See FECA § 203, 18 USC § 608(a)(1) (Supp 1975), repealed by the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 § 201, Pub L No 94-283,90 Stat 476,496. The personal funds
limits varied by the office sought. Presidential candidates could spend $50,000. Senate candi-
dates, and House candidates from states permitted only one representative, could spend $35,000,
and all other House candidates could spend a maximum of $25,000.
5 424 US 1 (1976).
6 See id at 39-59 (holding that FECA and its 1974 Amendments unconstitutionally limited
the amount individual candidates may spend on their own campaigns).
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an opening for candidates to spend unlimited campaign funds, as long
as those funds belong to the candidate personally or her family.
7
To close this loophole, legislators included in the McCain-
Feingold legislation a "Millionaire Amendment."8 As passed, the Mil-
lionaire Provision allows opponents of self-funded candidates to raise
campaign funds in amounts exceeding the statutory contribution lim-
its that would otherwise apply.9 By raising contribution limits for self-
financed candidates' opponents, the new law attempts to discourage
what Buckley prohibits the government from limiting directly: wealthy
individual candidates funding their own campaigns.
A potential constitutional problem arises in attempting to fit the
new law into the Buckley framework. ' Since campaign finance laws
concern political expression, a subject at the core of First Amendment
speech and association protections, any restrictions must be strictly
scrutinized for whether they meet a compelling government interest."
Buckley itself identified only one such interest-reducing the appear-
ance of corruption. The Court reasoned that limiting the dollar
amount a candidate may accept from any given contributor achieves
7 See Jonathan D. Salant, Millionaires in Congress Bring Potential Conflicts, Milwaukee J
Sentinel 17A (Jan 5, 2003) (indicating "[c]lose to half' of the incoming members of the 108th
Congress are millionaires); Amy Keller, The Roll Call 50 Richest: For Richer or Poorer: Thanks to
Spouses, Kerry Keeps Top Spot and Clinton Joins List, Roll Call (Sept 9,2002) (identifying the 50
wealthiest members of Congress and noting that at least 170 members are millionaires).
8 See BCRA § 304. This section contains the bulk of the changes affecting wealthy candi-
dates. Related elements can be found in § 319 (House members) and § 316 (available funds for-
mula for determining applicable spending thresholds). For examples of BCRA's more sweeping
and conspicuous provisions, see § 101 (banning national party committees from raising, spending,
or soliciting unregulated non-federal donations or "soft money"); §§ 201-04 (redefining "elec-
tioneering communication" and banning such communications within sixty days of an election).
These new restrictions "have been [among the] most frequently challenged by BCRA's oppo-
nents .... Joseph E. Sandier and Neil P. Reiff, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002: Law
and Explanation 24 (CCH Chicago 2002).
9 See BCRA § 307 (setting individual contribution limits to candidates, notwithstanding
Millionaire Provision adjustments, at $2,000 and indexing limit to inflation).
10 Various plaintiffs, over forty in number and ranging from the Republican National Com-
mittee to the California Democratic Party, challenged BCRA before a special three-judge panel
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See Sandler and Reiff, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 at 26 (cited in note 8). The McConnell plaintiffs (led by Senator
Mitch McConnell and authorized by BCRA) challenged the Millionaire Provision as, among
other things, infringing wealthy candidates' and contributors' First Amendment rights. Second
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, McConnell v FEC, No 02-0582
(RJL), Count VIII at *42-43 (D DC filed May 7, 2002), online at http://www.law.stanford.edu/
library/campaignfinance/mcconnell-v-feccomplaint5070 2 .pdf (visited May 8, 2003). In a May 1,
2003 decision, the panel unanimously declined to reach the question of the constitutionality of
the Millionaire Provision, finding that "this Court lacks standing to entertain challenges to this
provision." McConnell v FEC, No 02-0582, slip op at 11 (D DC May 1, 2003).
11 See Buckley, 424 US at 44-45 ("[T]he constitutionality of [campaign expenditure limits]
turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny
applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.").
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this interest.2 In the case of a self-funded candidate, it is not obvious
that this justification applies at all. After all, who is less likely to be
corrupted by donations than the candidate who need not accept any?
Further, if restricting the size of contributions to candidates reduces
corruption, why are those restrictions less essential simply because
one's opponent chooses to spend her own money?
As for other permissible compelling interests, Buckley squarely
rejected one of them: that the government may level the playing field
between candidates of diverse means. In particular, the Court denied
that the government's "interest in equalizing the financial resources of
candidates competing for federal office" could justify "restricting the
scope of federal election campaigns."'13 The Millionaire Provision-by
raising the contribution limit for opponents of wealthy candidates-
attempts to equalize candidates' ability to compete.
In this Comment, I address these issues by examining the consti-
tutionality of McCain-Feingold's Millionaire Provision, specifically,
the potential for a constitutional challenge based on the wealthy can-
didate's First Amendment rights. I introduce the new law in Part I, in-
cluding its complex formula for determining when a wealthy candi-
date triggers the Millionaire Provision and what benefits accrue to her
opponent. I also describe the different legislative accommodations
that entered into this provision during the legislative debate, and con-
clude by examining the rationale for the Millionaire Provision as re-
vealed in BCRA's legislative history.
Part II examines current campaign finance restrictions and their
permissible rationales after Buckley. I compare the treatment of con-
tributions and expenditures in the Buckley scheme and follow the
Court's treatment of contribution limits since 1976. Additionally, I
consider the relevant constitutional tests for campaign finance laws
challenged under the First Amendment, and examine how courts have
addressed several state campaign finance laws attacked on First
Amendment grounds.
Finally, Part III outlines the First Amendment challenge to
BCRA by examining two potential hurdles: (1) the free speech harm
from the Millionaire Provision and (2) whether the law survives judi-
cial scrutiny. I conclude that the new law does not harm free speech
values and, alternatively, that traditional government interests in cam-
paign finance regulation justify whatever harm the law inflicts.
12 See id at 26.
13 Id at56.
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I. BCRA's MILLIONAIRE PROVISION
At the start of congressional debate on the McCain-Feingold bill,
Senator Pete Domenici introduced an amendment to raise contribu-
tion limits for candidates facing self-funded opponents." Many De-
mocratic reformers opposed the Domenici Amendment, viewing it as
a step backward for campaign finance reform. McCain-Feingold sup-
porters argued that the amendment contradicted the stated goals of
reform by increasing contribution limits and the overall amount of
money in the political system." Nevertheless, after last-minute tweak-
ing of its provisions and in exchange for a total ban on unlimited, non-
federal contributions, or soft money, these reform supporters ulti-
mately accepted the Domenici Amendment's increase in limits."
A. Millionaire Threshold Formula and Opponent Benefits
BCRA's Millionaire Provision employs a complex formula to de-
termine the threshold spending amount for each candidate. If a self-
funded candidate spends more than twice that amount, she "triggers"
a provision that increases the contribution limits for her opponents.
Once these provisions are triggered, a self-funded candidate's oppo-
nent may then raise contributions in greater and greater amounts,
keyed to the level by which the self-funded candidate exceeds the
threshold. In addition, for a wealthy candidate who exceeds the self-
funding threshold limit by more than ten times, the new law removes
the ordinary limits on political party contributions to her opponent's
campaign."
For an illustration of the benefits that an opponent of a million-
aire can receive, take a hypothetical U.S. Senate candidate from Illi-
14 See Amy Keller and Paul Kane, Unscripted Debate Wins High Praise, Roll Call 1, 24
(Mar 22, 2001). Reform advocates initially viewed the passage of the amendment, on a 70-30
vote, as a setback for McCain-Feingold as it suggested that the reformers' coalition might disin-
tegrate as more loopholes for raising contribution limits emerged. See BCRA, S 27,107th Cong,
1st Sess (Jan 22, 2001), in 147 Cong Rec S 2466 (Mar 19, 2001) (remarks of Senators Dodd and
Reid).
15 See John Mercurio, Sharing the Wealth: Despite Vote to Punish Rich Candidates, Million-
aires Still a Big Factor for Democrats, Roll Call 15 (Mar 22, 2001) (quoting remarks by Democ-
ratic senators opposing the amendment, and noting that both major parties' Senate campaign
committees actively recruit wealthy candidates).
16 See Andrew Taylor and John Cochran, McCain-Feingold Tradeoffs Heighten Qualms
within Coalition, 59 CQ Wk 647,650-51 (2001) (discussing the passage of the Domenici Amend-
ment).
17 See BCRA § 304(a)(2). In addition, BCRA § 304(b) establishes a reporting requirement
to prevent candidates from dumping personal funds into a race shortly before Election Day.
Within fifteen days of becoming a candidate, an individual must notify the Federal Election
Commission and each candidate in the race of how much the candidate intends to spend from
her personal funds in excess of the threshold amount. BCRA requires similar declarations once
the candidate actually spends twice the threshold amount, and again at $10,000 increments.
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nois. With a November 2000 voting-age population (VAP) of
8,859,000,"8 BCRA § 304(a) establishes a threshold amount of
$504,360, which is the state's VAP multiplied by $.04, plus $150,000.
Once the candidate announces her intention to spend twice this
amount," or just over $1 million, her opponent may then raise contri-
butions of $6,000 from any individual, 2° three times the ordinarily ap-
plicable limit of $2,000. If the self-funded candidate continues to
spend personal funds and exceeds the threshold by four times the
limit ($2,017,440), her opponent may then raise contributions of
$12,000 from any individual.' These contribution limits are measured
per election, not per year or cycle, so if the new limits applied to both a
primary and a general election, the opponent could receive $24,000
from one individual, six times the ordinary limit of $2,000 per election.
If the self-funded candidate spends ten times the threshold limit
in personal funds ($5,043,600), in addition to a $12,000 contribution
limit from any individual, the opponent's political party may spend
additional funds to support its non-wealthy candidate. Under a provi-
sion unchanged by BCRA, normally, party limits allow a state or na-
tional party committee to spend the greater of $20,000 or $.02 times
the VAP. In Illinois, the limit would be just over $175,000 in coordi-
nated or independent party spending absent a wealthy opponent trig-
gering the opponent benefit provisions."
B. Adjustments to the Millionaire Amendment
The Millionaire Provision emerged from Congress containing
several features, some quite complex, to address concerns regarding
the law's application in a variety of situations. These attempts to fine-
tune the Millionaire Provision are important for a few reasons. First,
they reflect congressional concerns about the need to tailor the new
law to avoid charges of unfairness toward challengers by taking into
account their opponent's (presumably an incumbent's) fundraising
success when determining whether to boost anyone's contribution lim-
its. Additionally, the sophisticated nature of the legislative drafting in
this area helps to rebut allegations of statutory bluntness; the new law
takes into account numerous factors in determining whether to raise a
18 See US Census Bureau, Reported Voting and Registration of the Total Voting-Age
Population, by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, for States: November 2000, online at
http:// www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/p20-542/tabO4a.pdf (visited May 8,2003).
19 As required by BCRA § 304(b).
20 See BCRA § 304(a).
21 See id.
22 See id. Although the provisions contained in this section add some complexity, the law
essentially limits additional party expenditures-combined with contributions raised under in-
creased limits-to the amount of personal funds spent by the wealthy candidate.
23 See 2 USC § 441a(d)(3)(A) (2000).
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challenger's contribution limits. Three such factors include state-by-
state proportionality, incumbent and reciprocal funding advantages,
and caps on additional fundraising.
1. Proportionality between states.
The Millionaire Amendment as originally introduced merely con-
tained fixed-dollar limits on the maximum a self-financed candidate
could spend before her opponent received the benefit of increased
contribution limits.' If a self-financed candidate intended to spend
$500,000, the law would have tripled her opponent's contribution lim-
its. Similarly staggered increases occurred for self-financed candidates
spending $800,000 and over $1 million."
On the first day of debate, senators criticized the fixed limits as
insufficiently adapted to the varied cost of campaigning in different
states." Differences in both television advertising costs and state popu-
lations meant that a wealthy candidate would spend different amounts
depending on where the race took place.' Unamended to reflect these
geographical differences, the Senate voted down this first Millionaire
Amendment 51-48.2 Supporters acknowledged the shortcomings in
the amendment's then-current form, and reintroduced it the next day
21
with the voting age population formula described above.
2. Opposition personal and available funds offset.
Other features of the Millionaire Amendment appear designed to
mitigate fears that the measure had become an attempt to shield in-
cumbent officeholders from competitive races. The "Opposition Per-
sonal Funds Amount," which is used to determine the threshold
amount, first subtracts out any personal funds spent by the candidate
seeking increased limits. Under this provision, no millionaire incum-
24 See BCRA, 147 Cong Rec at S 2450 (Mar 19,2001).
25 See id.
26 See, for example, id at S 2455 (remarks of Senator McCain) (Such limits represent "a
meat-ax approach to a problem that requires a scalpel .... This does not get at really the different
aspects of a small state or a big state. If I had $1 million, I could buy a lot of TV [advertising] in
New Mexico. I cannot buy very much in California.").
27 A wealthy candidate in Wyoming, which has inexpensive television rates and few voters,
could conduct a relatively cheap campaign and a wealthy candidate might never reach the
threshold amount despite vastly outspending a non-wealthy opponent. California, by contrast,
has both high campaign costs and a large population, so a wealthy candidate would exceed these
set thresholds quickly.
28 See BCRA, 147 Cong Rec at S 2468 (Mar 19, 2001) (Rollcall Vote No 37). The vote
broke down largely along party lines, with Democrats (and reformist Republicans) voting against
the amendment and reform opponents (mostly Republicans) supporting it.
29 See id at S 2538 (Mar 20, 2001) (remarks of Senator DeWine).
30 See BCRA § 304(a)(2).
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bent senator may benefit from increased contribution limits when her
opponent is also a wealthy candidate.
The Millionaire Provision also contains another offset, one that
apparently recognizes that incumbent members of Congress can ac-
cumulate large war chests of campaign contributions and that the only
way to ensure a competitive race may be to increase a challenger's
willingness and ability to spend personal funds. The provision calcu-
lates the "Gross Receipts Advantage," which the law defines as the
aggregate amount of half a candidate's fundraising total, determined
on each of two days during the year before the election.31 Just as with
the opposition personal funds amount, the candidate seeking in-
creased contribution limits in response to a self-financing opponent
must first subtract her gross receipts advantage, if any. Suppose the
hypothetical Illinois senate candidate had managed to amass, through
private fundraising, a million-dollar campaign fund in the year leading
up to the campaign. The Millionaire Provision formula would include
that "gross receipts advantage" when calculating whether the candi-
date could raise funds under higher limits.'
3. Money raised under high limits subject to cap.
A final adjustment appearing in the Millionaire Provision prohib-
its a candidate from accepting contributions -or a party from spend-
ing on that candidate's behalf-when doing so would exceed the level
of personal funds spent by the candidate's wealthy opponent by 110
percent.33 Thus, the Millionaire Provision creates a cap on the non-
wealthy candidate's fundraising (achieved under elevated limits) and
the party's spending that is tied to the amount her opponent spends to
personally fund her campaign. As with other provisions, this appears
to have been added to address reformers' concerns that the increased
contribution limits moved campaign finance reform in the wrong di-
rection by increasing, rather than decreasing, the amount of money
spent on campaigns.
C. Congressional Intent and the Millionaire Provision
As noted above, although it permits some restrictions on political
speech in a campaign, Buckley recognizes that spending limits may in-
fringe First Amendment values; consequently such restrictions must
be necessary to accomplish a compelling government interest. Buckley
allowed contribution restrictions on an anti-corruption rationale, but
rejected the argument that Congress may permissibly restrict cam-
31 See BCRA § 316.
32 See id.
33 See BCRA § 304.
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paign spending in order to equalize different candidates' ability to
compete. In the Senate's debate over BCRA, however, advocates of
the Millionaire Provision pointed to the new law as both an anti-
corruption measure and a way to level the playing field.
1. Leveling the playing field.
During Senate deliberations, supporters of the Millionaire
Amendment candidly described what motivated their legislative at-
tempts. The Senate bill's main sponsor, Senator Domenici, stated,
"We're trying to ensure that the person running against a wealthy can-
didate gets a fair shake." Domenici later added, "By enacting this
common sense provision, the playing field will be leveled for candi-
dates who are not able to spend unlimited amounts of their own
money."3 The lead Democratic sponsor, Senator Richard Durbin,
noted that "[w]hat we are trying to address with this amendment is to
level the playing field .... That is what this amendment is all about. 36
A Republican co-sponsor of the Millionaire Amendment, Senator
Mike DeWine, described the provision as one "addressing the inequity
that arises when a wealthy candidate pays for his or her campaign
with personal funds."7 From these statements, this bipartisan coterie
of co-sponsors did not appear concerned with the Buckley tenet re-
garding equality as an impermissible government objective.
2. Reducing the appearance of corruption.
These same supporters of the Millionaire Provision also justified
the amendment as a measure to reduce corruption. Senator DeWine
stressed that the provision "addresses the public perception that there
is something inherently corrupt about a wealthy candidate who can
use a substantial amount of his or her personal resources to win an
election.3 . According to DeWine, the "amendment is narrowly tai-
lored, and closely related to [ ] concerns about [ ] perceived corrup-
tion." 9 Senator Durbin likewise urged support for the amendment, ar-
guing it would help end the perception that elections are "a system
34 Michael Coleman, Campaign Finance BillAmended, Albuquerque J A5 (Mar 21,2001).
35 BCRA, HR 2356,107th Cong, 1st Sess (Jun 28, 2001), in 148 Cong Rec S 2153 (Mar 20,
2002).
36 BCRA, 147 Cong Rec at S 2540 (Mar 20,2001).
37 Id at S 2538.
38 Id.
39 Id. Senator DeWine's remarks closely resemble the Supreme Court's language in its
constitutional tests to determine whether a law that infringes on speech survives judicial scrutiny.
See FEC v Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 US 431, 446 (2001) (noting
contribution limits must be "closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest") (quota-
tion marks omitted); Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377, 387-88 (2000)
(same). See also Part II.
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that is open to the highest bidder."" On final passage of McCain-
Feingold the following year, Senator Domenici touted the millionaire
restrictions by decrying the "perception that money rules the political
process," and noted that the "large number of extremely wealthy can-
didates ... reinforces this perception. Many people believe that candi-
dates are attempting to buy their way into office.""
By simultaneously advancing two competing rationales -fighting
the appearance of corruption and leveling the candidates' playing
field-the legislative history of the Millionaire Amendment suggests
either or both of these grounds motivated its sponsors. Yet, did either
of these two purported rationales truly drive the Senate's considera-
tion of what became § 304? One could view the Senators' floor asser-
tions with skepticism insofar as they affect incumbent officeholders'
own attempts at reelection. Both the Republican and Democratic
Senate campaign committees actively recruit millionaire candidates to
challenge incumbents and pursue open seats.2 On the other hand, self-
funded candidates endanger incumbent members of Congress in each
campaign cycle.
This is not, however, to dismiss some senators' honest concerns
that money controls the political process and congressional seats are
for sale -and their belief that voters share those concerns. One draws
this conclusion from the legislative history: Voters' elected representa-
tives view the proliferation of wealthy, self-funded candidates as an
inauspicious development.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
The Supreme Court's Buckley decision has controlled judicial
analysis of campaign finance laws for the last thirty years. Understand-
ing campaign finance jurisprudence requires that one first explore the
basic Buckley framework, focusing on the Court's rationale for analyz-
ing campaign contributions differently from expenditures. Aside from
this distinction, two issues arise in challenges to campaign finance re-
form statutes similar to the Millionaire provisions: (1) whether the
regulation in question results in First Amendment harm to the plain-
tiff and (2) whether the regulation can survive judicial scrutiny.
A. Buckley v Valeo
When the Court addressed the constitutional issues presented by
the Federal Election Campaign Act,3 it faced a far-reaching law that
40 BCRA, 147 Cong Rec at S 2540 (Mar 20,2001).
41 BCRA, 148 Cong Rec at S 2153 (Mar 20,2002).
42 See Mercurio, Sharing the Wealth, Roll Call at 20 (cited in note 15).
43 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub L No 92-225,86 Stat 3, as amended by
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restricted individual contributions to candidates" and parties,"5 and
party contributions to federal candidates.4 The law also imposed dis-
closure requirements on candidates and parties,7 and limited overall
campaign spending from personal funds. These last restrictions did not
survive Buckley.
1. Overall expenditure limits are unconstitutional.
The Court in Buckley ruled that Congress may not limit the total
amount of election campaign spending," since expenditure restrictions
"impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech."9 As such, expenditures may not be regulated as closely as
other types of political money. However, voluntary limits on campaign
spending do not receive the same scrutiny as government-mandated
expenditure limits, and Buckley suggested voluntary limits, like those
for presidential primaries, nominating conventions, and general elec-
tions, would survive a constitutional challenge.n The Court later af-
firmed a decision upholding a statute that conditioned the receipt of
public funds on a candidate's decision to limit his overall expendi-
tures. 1
2. Contribution limits are permissible.
In contrast, Buckley allowed the federal government to limit in-
dividuals' election-related contributions, reasoning that the govern-
ment's interests in reducing corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion "are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment
freedoms" that is caused by restricting the size of political contribu-
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub L No 93-443, 88 Stat 1263, codi-
fied as amended at 2 USC §§ 441-56 (2000).
44 See 2 USC § 441a(a)(1)(A) (limiting individual donations to candidates to $1,000 per
election). McCain-Feingold increased this limit to $2,000 and indexed it for inflation. See
BCRA § 307(a), (d).
45 See 2 USC § 441a(a)(1)(B) (limiting individual donations to national political parties to
$20,000 per calendar year). McCain-Feingold increased this limit to $25,000 and indexed it for in-
flation. See BCRA § 307(a), (d).
46 See 2 USC § 441a(d) (allowing national political parties to spend, on behalf of federal
candidates, an amount tied to the voting age population (for presidential and Senate candidates),
$20,000 (for Senate candidates), or $10,000 (for House candidates)). This section treats House
candidates from states entitled to only one representative the same as Senate candidates. See id.
47 See 2 USC § 434.
48 See 424 US at 51, 54-59 (invalidating limits on independent expenditures, candidates'
personal expenditures, and overall campaign spending).
49 Id at 39.
50 See id at 95-96 (holding that public financing furthers "sufficiently important govern-
mental interests and [does] not unfairly or unnecessarily burden[] the political opportunity of
any party or candidate").
51 See Republican National Committee v FEC, 487 F Supp 280, 284-87 (SD NY 1980), affd,
445 US 955 (1980).
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tions to candidates and groups.52 The Court recognized the potential
for intrusion on rights protected by the First Amendment, but held
that regulation of campaign finance "is also critical ... if confidence in
the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a dis-
astrous extent. 53
The Buckley Court ratified contribution limits by recognizing that
although contribution limits do affect free speech rights, contributions
are less deserving of protection than other forms of political speech.
The Buckley Court considered contributions as derivative, or conduit-
type speech, since contributions do not become speech until they pass
through a candidate's campaign." Contributions also represent sym-
bolic speech by the contributor, expressing support for a preferred
candidate.5 The indirect relationship between contributions and
speech permitted more stringent regulation -including dollar limits -
on the size of contributions.6
3. Buckley and limits on personal expenditures.
Given the Court's hostility toward overall expenditure limits, it is
unsurprising that it also invalidated FECA's restrictions on how much
an individual may spend on her own campaign. Restrictions on a
52 See 424 US at 29. The Court found the government's interest in limiting quid pro quos
compelling, noting "the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate
that the problem is not an illusory one." Id at 27.
53 Id at 27, quoting CSC v Letter Carriers, 413 US 548, 565 (1973). Letter Carriers recog-
nized the appearance-of-corruption rationale as a legitimate interest in upholding the prohibi-
tion against federal employee involvement in political campaigns by the Hatch Act, 5 USC
§ 7324(a)(2) (1988). See 413 US at 565.
54 See 424 US at 21 ("[T]he transformation of contributions into political debate involves
speech by someone other than the contributor.").
55 However, according to the Buckley Court, contribution limits do not significantly affect
the amount of symbolic speech. See id.
56 See id at 20-23. With regard to the contributor, the limit had little effect on speech be-
cause the contributor's only expression was the "undifferentiated symbolic act of contributing."
Id at 21. With regard to the candidate, the Court found "no indication" that the contribution limi-
tations "would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns" because the limits
would merely require candidates to generate funds from more people. Id. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the constitutionality of contribution limits as recently as 2000. See Nixon v Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377, 382 (2000) (approving a $1,075 contribution limit for
state elections). See also text accompanying notes 80-88.
57 See Buckley, 424 US at 54 (invalidating limitation on a candidate's personal expendi-
tures contained in 18 USC § 608(a)). The expenditure limitations, 18 USC § 608(a)(1) (1970 &
Supp 1973), read in relevant part:
No candidate may make expenditures from his personal funds, or the personal funds of his
immediate family, in connection with his campaign for nomination for election, or election,
to Federal office in excess of (A) $50,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of Presi-
dent or Vice President; (B) $35,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of Senator; or
(C) $25,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of Representative, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to the Congress.
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candidate's own expenditures must be analyzed in the same fashion as
campaign expenditure limits or limits on independent expenditures.
"The candidate," the Court opined, "no less than any other person, has
a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues
and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the
election of other candidates.
8
Moreover, the Court found that limits on a candidate's own con-
tributions to her campaign cannot be justified by the anti-corruption
rationale that sustained contribution limits. The problem of "undis-
closed and undue influence" disappears when a candidate self-
finances a campaign." According to the Court, "the use of personal
funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions
and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of
abuse to which the Act's contribution limitations are directed."' The
Court invalidated FECA's personal campaign expenditures limit be-
cause "the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [the Act's] restric-
tion upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit
on behalf of his own candidacy.
'61
B. First Amendment Harm
Following Buckley's approval of contribution restrictions and in-
validation of expenditure restrictions, courts reviewing campaign fi-
nance legislation have focused on two important questions. First,
whether the law impairs freedom of speech or, put another way,
whether there is First Amendment harm. Second, if there is such harm,
whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the harm.
BCRA is not the only subsequent legislative effort to limit the
impact that self-funded candidates and groups have on elections.
States have passed campaign finance reform proposals that employ
statutory mechanisms similar to the one created by Congress in
BCRA.6' Like BCRA, these laws provide benefits to one candidate in
58 Buckley, 484 US at 52.
59 Idat 53.
60 Id.
61 Idat 54.
62 See, for example, Ky Rev Stat Ann § 121A.030(5)(a), 121A.080(4)-(5) (Michie 1993) (re-
leasing publicly financed candidates from spending and contribution limits and providing match-
ing funds when their private-funded opponents exceed the spending limit); Minn Stat Ann
§ 10A.25(13) (West 1997) (increasing expenditure limits for candidates targeted by independent
expenditure campaigns); Minn Stat Ann § 10A.25(10)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1997) (releasing publicly
funded candidates from spending limits when their non-publicly-funded opponents exceed cer-
tain limits); RI Gen Laws Ann § 17-25 (Lexis 2000) (lifting publicly funded candidates' spending
limits when privately funded candidates exceed the publicly funded candidate's expenditure
limit). See also 21-A Me Rev Stat Ann §§ 1121-28 (West 1993 & Supp 2002) (providing public
funding, matching funds commensurate to a non-participating candidate's fundraising, and sub-
sidies for responding to independent expenditure campaigns).
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response to her opponent's campaign spending or that of an outside
group. Different courts have come to opposite conclusions on whether
singling out selected candidates for benefits in response to their op-
ponent's decision to exercise a constitutional right to spend campaign
funds infringes the opponent's free speech rights.
1. Benefiting candidates chills political speech.
In 1994, Minnesota's election law provided partial public subsi-
dies to campaigns that agreed to limit campaign expenditures volun-
tarily.' In addition, the law increased spending limits for these publicly
funded candidates and provided subsidies to them to respond to an
independent expenditure campaign ' run against them."5
Minnesota's law required groups or individuals seeking to con-
duct independent expenditure campaigns to notify the state election
board and the candidates in the race of their intentions. The candidate
facing an independent expenditure campaign may exceed the volun-
tary spending limit, up to the amount spent by the independent cam-
paign. Also, a candidate facing a hostile independent expenditure
campaign may' receive additional public subsidies in the amount of
half the level of the independent expenditure.6'In 1994, state political action committees, candidates, and con-
tributors challenged Minnesota's law in Day v Holahan. The Day
plaintiffs alleged that the law restricted their First Amendment rights
to make independent expenditures. The district court upheld these
provisions,w' but the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Eighth Circuit held,
"To the extent that a candidate's campaign is enhanced by the opera-
tion of the statute, the political speech of the individual or group who
made the independent expenditure 'against' her (or in favor of her
opponent) is impaired.""0 In the court's view, any group considering
making an independent expenditure would likely consider whether its
decision would cause its opponent to enjoy higher spending limits and
greater public financing. The knowledge that a targeted candidate
63 See Day v Hayes, 863 F Supp 940, 942-43 (D Minn 1994), affd in part, revd in part as
Day v Holahan, 34 F3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir 1994).
64 An independent expenditure campaign is one paid for by an individual or group not au-
thorized nor coordinated with any particular campaign or candidate in the race. See BCRA
§ 211.
65 See Hayes, 863 F Supp at 945-46.
66 Only those candidates who have qualified for public subsidies and have raised twice the
minimum matching funds are eligible for subsidies in response to independent expenditures. See
Minn Stat § 10A.25(13)(c) (Supp 1993).
67 See id.
68 34 F3d 1356, 1359 (8th Cir 1994).
69 See Hayes, 863 F Supp at 957-58.
70 Day, 34 F3d at 1360.
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would benefit could discourage an independent group from speaking
in the first place.7 In fact, the court stated that "[t]his 'self-censorship'
that has occurred even before the state implements the statute's man-
dates is no less a burden on speech that is susceptible to constitutional
challenge than is direct government censorship."72
2. Benefits to candidates enhances, not chills, political speech.
Two years after Day, in Rosenstiel v Rodriguez,7" the Eighth Cir-
cuit considered another legal challenge to Minnesota's campaign law.
Yet, in contrast to its previous decision, its opinion in this case sug-
gests that some benefits to candidates who agree to limit their spend-
ing do not harm their opponent's ability to exercise their First
Amendment rights.
The law challenged in Rosenstiel contained numerous provisions
designed to encourage political candidates to participate in the state's
campaign finance system. In exchange for voluntary candidate spend-
ing limits, the state provided campaign subsidies of up to half the
spending limit. The law also waived a participating candidate's spend-
ing limit if a non-participating opponent raised or spent over a certain
amount. Finally, donors to participating candidates-but not non-
participating candidates- received a partial tax refund for contribu-
tions, which encouraged donations."
The Rosenstiel plaintiffs argued that the waivable spending limit
and tax break provisions coerced candidates into a publicly subsidized
system of campaign finance." This coercion, the plaintiffs contended,
offended the First Amendment. The court disagreed. It determined
that the waivable spending limit does not coerce candidates because it
allows the non-participating candidate to control her participating op-
ponent's funding." The candidate who opts out of the system may still
raise (and spend) as much money as the candidate pleases. Once the
non-participating candidate exceeds the participating candidate's
spending limit, she waives her opponent's spending limit. The level of
her adversary's spending rests entirely in the hands of the non-
participating candidate.7 The court also upheld the tax break incentive
as not infringing on First Amendment rights, calling the tax refund
71 See id (finding that the law "chills the free exercise of that protected speech").
72 Id.
73 101 F3d 1544 (8th Cir 1996).
74 See id at 1546-47.
75 See id at 1549.
76 Seeid at 1551.
77 See id ("[The statute] permits the nonparticipating candidate to control whether and
when the participating opponent will be freed from the limits. Thus, in a sense, the amendment
works in favor of, rather than to the detriment of, the nonparticipating candidate.").
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"simply an additional public subsidy provided to participating candi-
dates."78
3. Reconciling the dilemma: Incentives to limit spending do not
chill speech.
So which Eighth Circuit panel is correct? One easy argument is
that both are right. A few key elements distinguish Day and Rosenstiel
and can account for their seemingly contradictory conclusions. Day
invalidated public subsidies to a candidate in response to being tar-
geted by an independent expenditure campaign. Rosenstiel approved
of public subsidies to a candidate in response to her opponent's cam-
paign spending. In the latter situation, the non-participating candidate
can control the consequence of exceeding a known threshold. In the
former, by definition, the candidate cannot, since she does not author-
ize nor direct an independent expenditure campaign.
But the distinction between independent and candidate expendi-
tures forms a slender reed on which to rest these contrary decisions.
The First Amendment's free speech clause protects both independent
and candidate expenditures. Recall that Buckley makes no distinction
between the two; the Court there struck down campaign spending lim-
its and independent expenditure limits alike for encroaching on core
areas of free speech. The harms alleged by the plaintiffs-diminished
exercise of free speech-do not turn on whether the candidate or an
independent group speaks.
Perhaps the different type of benefits conferred on candidates
under the different laws helps distinguish the outcomes in these two
cases. Day invalidated provisions that both increased public subsidies
to a candidate targeted by an independent expenditure campaign, and
increased the targeted candidate's expenditure limits. Rosenstiel vali-
dated tax benefits to encourage additional donations to participating
candidates. Regardless, this alone cannot account for the contrary
court decisions: Both conferred benefits on participating candidates
and denied them to non-participants.
The two decisions still collide on the critical issue: Whether in-
creasing expenditure limits for one candidate violates the free speech
rights of a potential speaker. In Part III, I argue that Rosenstiel con-
tains the better reasoning: The mere provision of benefits to one can-
didate does not chill the speech of her opponent.
78 Id. See also id at 1555 n 11 (rejecting the argument that allowing some candidates' do-
nors to receive tax refunds "puts the state's imprimatur on publicly funded candidates").
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C. Judicial Scrutiny and Governmental Interests
Before examining the Millionaire Provision against this backdrop,
one Supreme Court decision illuminated both what standard of review
courts should apply to contribution limits and what governmental in-
terests satisfy the government's burden. Since campaign finance re-
strictions touch on core First Amendment concerns, courts have usu-
ally held that campaign finance laws must meet strict scrutiny.79
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v Shrink Mis-
souri Government PAC," decided after Day and Rosenstiel, clarified
that contribution limits receive a less exacting review than strict scru-
tiny. The plaintiffs in Shrink Missouri challenged Missouri's inflation-
adjusted state contribution limit of $1,075. 1 They argued that the state
had not presented sufficient evidence that the law met the state's le-
gitimate interests, since it had neither shown empirical evidence of
corruption nor demonstrated the public's belief in the appearance of
corruption.8" The Eighth Circuit agreed and struck down the law," but
the Supreme Court reversed. 4
Justice Souter's majority opinion reiterated that contribution re-
strictions "require less compelling justification than restrictions on in-
dependent spending."5 Rather, the crucial question for the Court was
"whether there was any showing that the limits were so low as to im-
pede the ability of candidates to 'amas[s] the resources necessary for
effective advocacy.....
Importantly, the Shrink Missouri Court also noted its institutional
unwillingness to "second-guess a legislative determination as to the
need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared. ' 'n
79 See, for example, Buckley, 424 US at 44-45 (finding expenditure limits must satisfy "ex-
acting scrutiny applicable to limitation on core First Amendment rights of political expression").
Commentators and the Court, in subsequent decisions, have faulted Buckley's vagueness in es-
tablishing the proper level of review for different campaign restrictions. See, for example, Shrink
Missouri, 528 US at 386 ("Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribu-
tion limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion."); Richard Briffault, Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 Minn L
Rev 1729,1745 (2002) ("Buckley had been maddeningly imprecise on this question.").
80 528 US 377 (2000).
81 See id at 382-85. In current dollars, the Missouri contribution limit permitted donations
much smaller than those approved in Buckley's 1976 decision.
82 See id at 384-85.
83 See Shrink Missouri Government PAC v Adams, 161 F3d 519 (8th Cir 1998).
84 See Shrink Missouri, 528 US at 385.
85 Id at 387 (quotation marks omitted). See also Briffault, 85 Minn L Rev at 1729-30 (cited
in note 79).
86 Shrink Missouri, 528 US at 397.
87 Id at 391 n 5, citing FEC v National Right to Work Committee, 459 US 197, 210 (1982).
The Shrink Missouri majority also accepted the legislature's finding of perceived corruption,
which the state supported with several news articles regarding political scandals, the results of a
voter referendum on reform, and a legislator's affidavit attesting to the public's perception of
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The Court abjures this deference, however, when examining laws that
create a "risk [of] such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incum-
bents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge."'
The decisions in Day (1994) and Rosenstiel (1996) predate Shrink
Missouri. Day shows that courts examine purported state interests se-
riously. The court, viewing the state's justification as pretextual, invali-
dated Minnesota's law providing matching funds to independent ex-
penditure campaign targets.? Even had the Day court shown the level
of deference toward the state's assertion of its interest that the Su-
preme Court showed in Shrink Missouri, it is doubtful the outcome
would have changed. The court held that the law challenged would not
have met even the most cursory review."
The Rosenstiel court argued that encouraging participation in
public funding programs constitutes a compelling state interest, when
candidate participation helps reduce corruption or its appearance, in-
cluding through reducing the time and energy candidates exert raising
money." This conclusion fits with the post-Buckley trend of expanding
the range of corruption-related interests that can justify state cam-
paign laws.? The Court has recognized that corruption of the electoral
process can result from the "corrosive and distorting effects of im-
mense aggregations of wealth," which "have little or no correlation to
the public's support for ... political ideas."93 Although the Court con-
fined its decision to those effects caused by corporate aggregations of
wealth, it may be logically extended to personal wealth accumulation.
So, the state's interest in reducing corruption may include types of
corruption apart from the quid pro quo corruption recognized in
Buckley, ' and states may pursue that goal by encouraging participa-
corruption. The sufficiency of this quantum of evidence was "not [] a close call" according to the
Court. Id at 393.
88 Shrink Missouri, 528 US at 402-04.
89 The state attempted to justify the provisions by insisting that they were necessary to en-
courage candidate participation in the state's partial public financing system. The court reasoned
that the new provisions could not be "necessary" because, even prior to the regulation, candidate
participation in the state's partial subsidies system reached 97 percent. See 34 F3d at 1361 ("One
hardly could be faulted for concluding that this 'compelling' state interest was contrived for pur-
poses of this litigation.").
90 See id at 1362 ("The statute's burden on First Amendment rights does not satisfy strict,
intermediate, or even the most cursory scrutiny.").
91 See 101 F3d at 1553.
92 See, for example, Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 (1990) (uphold-
ing state ban on corporate independent expenditures); Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diver-
sity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 S Ct Rev 105,106 ("The concept that government may
tone down or amplify particular voices in order to promote speaker diversity is no longer a
stranger to the First Amendment.").
93 Austin, 494 US at 660.
94 See 424 US at 27-28.
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tion in public finance systems that reduce corruption by reducing the
time and energy candidates spend amassing funds.
With this background of Buckley and subsequent court decisions
reviewing state campaign finance laws, the stage is set to examine
BCRA's Millionaire Provision.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE
MILLIONAIRE PROVISION
The Millionaire Provision has been attacked on First Amendment
and Equal Protection grounds in an ongoing lawsuit seeking to invali-
date various provisions of BCRA.' In an argument similar to that re-
lied upon by the Eighth Circuit in Day, the plaintiffs contend that the
Millionaire Provision burdens speech by benefiting a wealthy candi-
date's opponent. This Part argues that the Millionaire Provision in-
flicts slight, if any, First Amendment harm on wealthy candidates.
Even if there is a First Amendment harm, whatever free speech in-
fringement exists by virtue of the raised contribution limits may be
justified by achieving the government's interest in reducing corrup-
tion.
A. No Likely Burdens on Free Speech
In fashioning the Millionaire Provision, lawmakers sought to
avoid Buckley's strict prohibition on spending limits. In order to find
that BCRA impermissibly burdens speech, a court must hold that re-
leasing others from contribution limits constitutes a restriction on the
speaker who is not released from those limits. As seen above, the first
federal appeals court to consider this question, the Eighth Circuit, has
reached two different answers." Given these varying treatments of
First Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws, the next step
requires understanding why the Eighth Circuit's Rosenstiel decision
contains the better reasoning and applies with more force to BCRA's
Millionaire Provision than its conclusion in Day, that any attempt to
facilitate the speech of one candidate impairs the rights of the oppo-
nent.9
95 See Second Amended Complaint, McConnell v FEC, No 02-0582 (RJL) (cited in note
10).
96 Compare Day, 34 F3d 1356 (invalidating subsidies to publicly funded candidates tar-
geted by independent expenditure campaigns), with Rosenstiel, 10f F3d 1544 (upholding subsi-
dies to publicly funded candidates, waivable spending limits, and tax refunds to their donors).
97 See Day, 34 F3d at 1360 ("To the extent that a candidate's campaign is enhanced by the
operation of the statute, the political speech of the individual or group who made the independ-
ent expenditure 'against' her (or in favor of her opponent) is impaired.").
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1. Responsive speech augments the First Amendment.
First, any speech by a wealthy candidate's opponent, funded by
relaxed contribution limits, would necessarily occur after the self-
funded candidate has "spoken" (that is, spent the money) or an-
nounced her intention to do so. As such, the non-wealthy candidate
engages in responsive speech, following the initial expressive activity
by the wealthy candidate.
The First Circuit's 2000 decision in Daggett v Commission on
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices" supports this idea. The
Daggett court reviewed Maine's full, voluntary, publicly-funded elec-
tion system, which provided participating candidates both a dollar-for-
dollar match of their non-participating opponent's fundraising total,
and matching funds, like in Day, to respond to independent expendi-
ture campaigns.'O°
The Daggett court did not view the dispute as a zero-sum game
where the speech funded by the government subsidies cancelled out
the speech from the independent expenditures that triggered the state
subsidies in the first place. Instead, the court reasoned that independ-
ent spenders and the candidates they support "have no right to speak
free from response" and that such a provision increased, rather than
infringed, political speech."' In so concluding, the First Circuit rejected
Day: "We cannot adopt the logic of Day, which equates responsive
speech with an impairment to the initial speaker. ' A similar argu-
ment applies to BCRA's Millionaire Provision: The fact that a wealthy
candidate's speech increases his opponent's ability to raise funds does
not impair the speech of the wealthy candidate.
The Daggett court did not address the concern that motivated the
Eighth Circuit in Day: that the knowledge that one's opponent will
benefit from a wealthy candidate's spending will inhibit the self-
funded candidate from speaking in the first place. Three reasons, how-
ever, suggest that the Day court's fear would not materialize with
wealthy candidates. First, in a race between a wealthy and a non-
wealthy candidate, the self-funded aspirant will almost always be able
to outspend her opponent. Thus, the wealthy candidate will still bene-
fit from her ability to spend her own money. Additionally, aside from
her ability to spend more, the wealthy candidate benefits from the
98 The Millionaire Provision increases contribution limits after an opponent announces her
intention to spend a certain amount of personal funds. This is to deter self-funded candidates
from dumping a large amount of personal funds in the final days of a campaign, effectively un-
dermining the provision.
99 205 F3d 445 (1st Cir 2000).
100 See id at 450-51.
101 See id at 464.
102 Id at 465.
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ease with which she obtains her campaign funds. After all, her non-
wealthy opponent must spend a significant amount of time raising
funds. The wealthy candidate need only write a check. 3 The task of
raising and spending campaign funds will remain more daunting for
the non-self-funded candidate. The wealthy candidate always has
more options than the non-wealthy one, since a self-funded candidate
can always choose to raise funds through limited individual contribu-
tions.'°'
Second, the wealthy candidate retains control over how much her
opponent may permissibly raise. By strategically limiting her own ex-
penditures, the wealthy candidate may choose whether to benefit her
opponent with raised contribution levels, and if so, at what increased
contribution level. Courts that have evaluated the legitimacy of state
incentives to participate in campaign finance systems have focused on
the notion of coercion. '° Statutory provisions that leave a candidate a
choice as to whether to participate are viewed much more favorably
than those that coerce candidates into joining the program through
draconian measures.
Third, Day's conclusion regarding the "chilling" effect proves too
much. Day invalidated publicly financed subsidies given to a candidate
in response to independent expenditure campaigns against that candi-
date or in support of her opponent. The court reasoned that the plain-
tiffs were harmed by the knowledge that their opponents would bene-
fit, via public subsidies, from their expenditures-and that this harm
discouraged them from making those expenditures in the first place.
103 The First Circuit described the argument by the appellants, who sought to invalidate
candidate subsidies in response to an opponent's or an independent's expenditure as "a claim of
a First Amendment right to outraise and outspend an opponent." Id at 464.
104 Consider the decision in Republican National Committee v FEC, 487 F Supp 280, 285
(SD NY 1980), affd 445 US 955 (1980), in the context of the presidential public funding system:
[A] candidate with an additional funding alternative which he or she would not otherwise
have ... does not deprive the candidate of other methods of funding which may be thought
to provide greater or more effective exercise of rights of communication or association than
would public funding. Since the candidate remains free to choose between funding alterna-
tives, he or she will opt for public funding only if, in the candidate's view, it will enhance the
candidate's powers of communication and association.
105 See Rosenstiel, 101 F3d at 1552 ("This scheme presents candidates with an additional,
optional campaign funding choice, the participation in which is voluntary .... Given this ... the
State's scheme promotes, rather than detracts from, cherished First Amendment values."); Vote
Choice v DiStefano, 4 F3d 36,38 (1st Cir 1993) ("[V]oluntariness has proven to be an important
factor in judicial ratification of government-sponsored campaign financing schemes."); Wilkinson
v Jones, 876 F Supp 916,927 (WD Ky 1995) ("[T]he determination whether to engage in the trig-
gering activity ... is within the privately-financed candidate's complete control."). For the impor-
tance of voluntariness in federal spending limits, see, for example, Buckley, 424 US at 95
("[A]cceptance of public financing entails voluntary acceptance of an expenditure ceiling."); Re-
publican National Committee, 487 F Supp at 285 (stressing the importance that "the candidate
remains free to choose between funding alternatives").
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This principle, applied to other situations, proves unwieldy. If this
logic holds, any campaign finance incentives in any system could cre-
ate an arguable First Amendment harm. For instance, it is difficult to
see how the federal government's system of partial subsidies in presi-
dential primaries and full public funding in presidential general elec-
tions would survive. '°6 The federal subsidies and full public funding
benefit only those candidates who cannot afford to self-fund. ' ' Thus, a
wealthy candidate would be discouraged from spending her own funds
because, by doing so, she would become ineligible for public funds.
Under the Day rationale, therefore, the wealthy candidate suffers First
Amendment harm. But it cannot be that the federal funding system
harms wealthy candidates who opt out and choose to fund their own
campaigns.'' They retain - and use - another avenue for funding their
campaign: self-funding. Furthermore, the government does not have to
treat candidates equally in encouraging participation in its campaign
finance systems. As the First Circuit explained in Daggett, "a voluntary
campaign finance scheme must rely on incentives for participation,
which, by definition, means structuring the scheme so that participa-
tion is usually the rational choice.' ' Without providing incentives, the
state could never encourage voluntary compliance with a program de-
signed to reduce corruption or its appearance."'
2. Varying contribution limits do not restrict speech.
BCRA's Millionaire Provision raises the possibility of two candi-
dates, in the same race, raising different-sized contributions. But the
fact that two opponents must raise private funds, if they raise funds at
all, subject to different contribution limits would not create a First
Amendment problem in itself. States have encouraged candidates to
106 In primaries, federal candidates for President may receive matching funds for their pri-
vately raised donations in exchange for agreeing to limit their expenditures. In presidential gen-
eral elections, candidates receive full public funding in exchange for the same forbearance. In
addition, the candidates agree not to raise private funds for the general election. See text accom-
panying note 51.
107 In 1979, opponents of the presidential system argued that the presidential system uncon-
stitutionally coerced all candidates into participating and infringed their First Amendment rights
by barring anyone from contributing to or making expenditures on behalf of publicly funded
presidential candidates. The district court rejected both arguments, and the Supreme Court af-
firmed. See Republican National Committee, 487 F Supp at 285-86.
108 See Buckley, 424 US at 92-93 ("[The presidential public funding system] is a congres-
sional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate
and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process .... [It] furthers, not
abridges, pertinent First Amendment values."). The Millionaire Provision employs federal con-
tribution limits, instead of public funding, to achieve this goal.
109 205 F3d at 470 (quotation marks omitted).
110 The state can even express a preference for smaller donations over larger ones. See
Buckley, 424 US at 107 ("The thrust of the [presidential primary matching] legislation is to re-
duce financial barriers and to enhance the importance of smaller contributions.").
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limit their spending by making fundraising easier, not only by provid-
ing public subsidies, but by increasing their donation limits.
The First Circuit, in Vote Choice, Inc v DiStefano,"' approved
Rhode Island's campaign finance system of differing contribution lim-
its."' Rhode Island maintained a $1,000 contribution limit for all can-
didates, but doubled it for candidates who accepted public financing
and agreed to limit their spending to a statutorily defined amount. The
court held that incentives to accept public funding did not penalize
those who opted out of the system: "[T]he contribution cap gap ...
neither penalizes certain classes of office-seekers nor coerces candi-
dates into surrendering their first amendment rights.""'
The Vote Choice court did issue a caveat by noting that, at some
point, the state's incentives to participate in its public finance system
could become so lucrative that they deny candidates the freedom to
choose between funding methods. When "regulatory incentives stray
beyond the pale, creating disparities so profound that they become
impermissibly coercive," the court expressed its willingness to invali-
date those elements of a campaign finance system."'
Disparate contribution limits do not necessarily create a constitu-
tional infirmity. Under the Vote Choice view, the coerciveness of a
campaign finance system's carrots and sticks determines whether it
creates a First Amendment problem."' The Millionaire Provision
should likewise avoid this constitutional problem, as long as, in prac-
tice, the incentives do not become so overbearing that a candidate
would rather run against a millionaire than run as a millionaire. If a
wealthy candidate can still find that funding her own campaign creates
a net advantage, then it is difficult to classify the increased contribu-
tion limit for her opponent as "coercive. '"6 Moreover, the argument
that increased contribution limits could be coercive applies with less
force to wealthy candidates. In a race between two candidates of rela-
tively equal means, every potential advantage can mean the difference
between winning and losing."' The manifest advantages enjoyed by
111 4 F3d 26.
112 See id at 37,40.
113 Id at 39.
114 See id at 38.
115 One might argue that "coercive" is synonymous with "effective" and the law could thus
work too well. But an alternative exists. The Millionaire Provision might achieve its goal of re-
ducing the appearance of corruption in a way that does not impose limits on candidate speech.
116 To extend the analogy, just as a state candidate could voluntarily limit her spending in
exchange for public funding and an easier fundraising task, the wealthy candidate can voluntarily
limit her spending in exchange for imposing lower (that is, the original) contribution limits on
her opponent.
117 In a race between candidates of different means, say, an incumbent and a wealthy chal-
lenger, both candidates might have access to equal funds. The Millionaire Provision accounts for
this, by capping fundraising under elevated limits to the level of personal spending by one's op-
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wealthy candidates suggest they would be less susceptible to a cam-
paign finance system's incentives to limit spending.
This Comment has argued that the Millionaire Provision does not
infringe freedom of speech for three reasons. First, BCRA does not
limit a wealthy opponent's speech; it increases the ability of his oppo-
nent to speak without limiting the speech of the wealthy candidate.
Second, even if the increased contribution limits could, in some cir-
cumstances, create First Amendment harm, the federal courts have
only recognized such harm when it is "coercive." These cases make
clear that BCRA is not coercive. Finally, even if the variable contribu-
tion limits burden a wealthy candidate's First Amendment rights, the
Millionaire Provision should still be sustained because it meets the ju-
dicial scrutiny required by Buckley and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions.
B. Raising Contribution Limits May Meet Judicial Scrutiny
Buckley held that campaign finance laws may burden speech to
reduce corruption or the appearance of corruption. The federal courts
have held that state incentives to participate in state campaign finance
systems may be justified on the same rationale: Participation in the
campaign finance systems reduces corruption through voluntary
spending limits and partial public funding.
At first blush, these cases seem inapposite. Congress could not be
attempting to encourage compliance with a system of partial or total
public funding and voluntary spending limits: There is no such system
for congressional candidates. Rather, the Millionaire Provision resem-
bles an incumbent protection scheme or an attempt to equalize candi-
date competitiveness, two impermissible state interests."8 However,
Congress has in effect created a system of voluntary spending limits
by establishing statutory thresholds for spending personal funds. The
Millionaire Provision limits spending personal funds and creates a
voluntary cap at twice the statutory threshold, at which point the op-
ponent's contribution limits begin to rise. Overall federal campaign
spending remains uncapped outside the presidential election.
BCRA's congressional supporters argued that reducing the
amount of money in the political system-and wealthy candidates'
ability to "buy" a seat in Congress -reduces precisely the type of cor-
ruption that voters fear most: that money matters more than ideas in
electoral contests."9 Congress may decide that its legislative goals re-
ponent, and by factoring in each candidate's success in accumulating campaign funds. See Parts
I.B.2 and I.B.3.
118 See, for example, Shrink Missouri, 528 US at 402; Buckley, 424 US at 48-49.
119 See Part I.C.
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quire encouraging voluntary personal spending limits and "need not
be completely neutral"'20 in encouraging wealthy candidates to comply.
Furthermore, BCRA is narrowly tailored to achieve this purpose
of preventing corruption without becoming unnecessarily restrictive.
Several aspects of the Millionaire Provision in particular demonstrate
Congress's attention to detail in crafting it.
First, the provision increases contribution limits incrementally,
graduated to the wealthy candidate's own spending. A candidate's
contribution limits increase to a certain level and no higher, regardless
of the self-funded candidate's spending.
Second, the provision benefits a non-wealthy candidate only inso-
far as she does not raise funds beyond her wealthy opponent's per-
sonal spending level." Both the House and Senate measures cap the
fundraising accomplished under looser restrictions to the level of the
opponent's self-funding.
Third, the formula for determining who benefits from the Mil-
lionaire Provision factors in the personal spending of both candidates,
to avoid flooding a race with more funds-both money raised under
higher limits and from candidates' own funds. ' Every dollar of per-
sonal funds spent by one opponent counts against the threshold for-
mula for determining the opponent's raised contribution limits.
Finally, the Millionaire Provision takes into account each candi-
date's available funds raised in anticipation of a race, to help rebut the
charge that the new law helps further entrench incumbent members of
Congress.'2, By accounting for "available funds," the law avoids dis-
criminating against challengers whose only opportunity to win could
hinge on personal spending because of the war chest amassed by the
incumbent.
These provisions answer critics' charges that the increase in con-
tribution limits gives lie to Congress's assertion that the limits are
necessary to reduce corruption. Given the judicial deference typically
shown to legislative determinations regarding corruption in politics,u
Congress may determine that wealthy candidate spending poses a
greater "corruption" threat, and one that has not yet been addressed .
120 Vote Choice, 4 F3d at 39-40.
121 See Part I.A.
122 See Part I.B.3.
123 See Part I.B.2.
124 See id.
125 See, for example, Shrink Missouri, 528 US at 391-92 & n 5.
126 Buckley itself found Congress uniquely qualified to make other determinations regard-
ing the appropriate, corruption-reducing contribution level. Regarding the original congressional
decision to limit individual contributions to $1,000, the Court noted, "Congress' failure to engage
in such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation.... Illf it is satisfied that some limit on con-
tributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not
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In this sense, Congress is balancing two different risks of corruption. It
is increasing the chance of quid pro quo corruption through increased
individual contribution limits for one candidate, while decreasing the
risk of the appearance of corruption through the phenomenon of
wealthy individuals "buying" congressional seats that are "for sale."
CONCLUSION
The BCRA provisions dealing with wealthy, free-spending candi-
dates can survive judicial scrutiny, since they avoid direct restrictions
on a candidate's spending and leave the candidate's First Amendment
rights unimpaired. The state's interests in reducing the appearance of
corruption justify whatever harm to free speech might arise, judged
under the standard of scrutiny the Supreme Court applies to contribu-
tion restrictions. This Comment analyzed only the potential for a con-
stitutional challenge based on the wealthy candidate's First Amend-
ment rights. Other avenues may prove more treacherous for the Mil-
lionaire Provision, from donors' or political parties' free speech and
association interests127 to equal protection claims.'2 These possibilities
lie beyond the scope of this Comment.
Congress has created a system of incentives it says will increase
the amount of free speech and widen the pool of candidates beyond
the independently wealthy. Congress has sought a constitutional way
to address campaigns by wealthy self-funded candidates for more than
the last quarter-century. The Millionaire Provision does this without
burdening free speech. The law may in fact enhance speech, and simul-
taneously enhance the faith of the electorate that public office cannot
be bought by the highest bidder. Twenty-eight years ago, the Supreme
Court found this aspiration "critical ... if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous ex-
tent.""9
serve as well as $1,000." 424 US at 30 (quotation marks omitted).
127 See BCRA § 304 (permitting party donations over the normal limit when an opponent's
personal funds amount reaches ten times the threshold limit).128 Buckley considered and rejected a similar claim. See 424 US at 30-35. The Republican
National Committee, as a plaintiff in the consolidated McConnell v FEC, made this argument
and urged the court to extend the benefits of unlimited party spending and higher contribution
limits to all candidates, rather than invalidate the provisions. See Consolidated Brief for Plaintiffs
in Support of Motion for Judgment, McConnell v FEC, No 02-0582, RNC Brief, Title III at *73-
75 (D DC filed Nov 6, 2002), online at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance/
mcconnell/SFX20B.pdf (visited May 8,2003).
129 Buckley, 424 US at 27 (quotation marks omitted).
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